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IV, STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
1. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-2-(3)(j) (1996). See also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
However, this Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was poured-over from the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
V, NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
2. This proceeding is an appeal for a Divorce Decree and Modifications thereto issued 
by the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third District Court, State of Utah, whereby he 
awarded, inter alia, alimony, attorney fees, monetary interest on the marital residence and 
lA of fire insurance proceeds. The Appellant Mr. Lovato does not contest the Findings of 
Fact but instead contests the trial court's application of the law to the facts. The Appellant 
Mr. Edward F. Lovato ("Appellant/Petitioner/Mr. Lovato") sued the Appellee Ms. Petra 
Lovato ("Appellee/Respondent/Ms. Lovato") for divorce. Ms. Lovato counterclaimed. The 
case went to trial before Judge Nehring beginning September 3,1999 The trial court did not 
enter separately Conclusions of Law but entered combined conclusions and findings under 
the heading Findings of Fact and an Amended Divorce Decree. 
VL RELATED PRIOR APPEALS 
3. There are no prior appeals relating to this matter. 
1 - Brief of Appellant 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Issues. 
4. Whether the court erred when it ruled that 
a. Mr. Lovato pay alimony. The court failed to properly apply the factors in setting 
alimony and offset child support by the alimony amount. 
b. Mr. Lovato had the ability to pay attorney fees. Ms. Lovato failed to 
demonstrate that Mr. Lovato had the ability to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees and that the 
findings do not support such award. 
c. Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital residence should bear an interest rate. The 
Court went beyond its authority when it ruled that Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital home 
should bear interest. 
d. Insurance proceeds were a marital asset. Despite evidence to the contrary, Vi of 
the insurance proceeds from a house fire were awarded to the Ms. Lovato. 
B. Standards of Review. 
5. Alimony. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and 
property distribution in divorce cases.1 A trial court's conclusions of law with respect to 
alimony are reviewed for correctness, accordingly no deference is given to the trial court.2 
1
 Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
2
 Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah App. 1995). 
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In the instant case, since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not consistent with 
the Divorce Decree, the appellate court must review for correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court.3 Further, Mr. Lovato does not contest the Findings of Fact but instead contests 
the trial court's application of the law to the facts. The trial court did not enter separately 
Conclusions of Law but entered instead combined conclusions of law with the findings of 
fact under the heading Findings of Fact and also an Amended Divorce Decree. 
6. Property Division. A Court's distribution of property in a divorce proceeding is 
"endowed with presumption of validity and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly 
unjust or clear abuse of discretion."4 
7. Attorney Fees. Whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award 
of attorney fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.5 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
8. This is an appeal from a Divorce Decree and its modification thereto issued by the 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring whereby he awarded, inter alia, alimony, attorney fees, 
monetary interest on the marital home and lA of fire insurance proceeds to Ms. Lovato despite 
See Appendix "A" copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated November 2, 2000 (Court 
Record, 333-347) and Amended Divorce Decree dated November 1, 1999 (Court Record, 394-410). 
4
 Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah App. 1988). 
5
 Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996). 
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evidence and findings to the contrary. The Divorce Decree was entered on September 30, 
1999 and then amended on November 1, 1999.6 The Mr. Lovato sued Ms. Lovato for 
divorce. Ms. Lovato counterclaimed. The case went to trial before Judge Nehring beginning 
September 3,1999. The case was taken under advisement and the judge issued his ruling in 
open court on September 30, 1999. 
9. The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring found for Ms. Lovato on issues regarding 
alimony, attorney fees, monetary interest on marital residence and awarding lA fire insurance 
proceeds to Ms. Lovato. He entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared 
by Ms. Lovato.7 However, since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
inconsistent with the Amended Divorce Decree and no conclusions of law are stated 
separately, Mr. Lovato appeals the Amended Divorce Decree. The decision of th trial court 
is contrary to the findings of facts and the evidence presented at trial. 
B. Course of Proceedings. The Course Proceedings are as follows: 
10. On October 9, 1997 Mr. Lovato filed for divorce in the Third District Court in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.8 
6
 See copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached herewith as Appendix "A" and Amended 
Divorce Decree attached herewith as Appendix "B", both incorporated herein. 
7
 See copy ofFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached herewith as Appendix "A" and 
incorporated herewith. 
8
 See Court Record, pages 1-5. 
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11. On October 30, 1997 Ms. Lovato answered and counterclaimed.9 
12. After various discovery and various motions the court entertained on April 2, 
1998 a motion to bifurcate proceedings.10 The motion was granted and the decree of divorce 
entered on April 16, 1998.u 
13. On September 3, 8, 10 and 30, 1999 this case was tried before the Honorable 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring.12 
14. On October 25, 1999 Mr. Lovato filed his Objections to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law with the Court.13 
15. On November 4, 1999 the Court rejected in a Minute Entry Mr. Lovato5s 
Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.14 
16. Then, on November 11,1999 Mr. Lovato filed a Motion For A New Trial Or To 
Correct Findings & Decree.15 
9
 Id. Pages 8-19. 
10
 Id. Pages 145-146. 
11
 Id. Pages 153-154. 
12
 Id. Pages 476-478. 
13
 Id. Pages 373-393. 
14
 Id. Page 411. 
15
 Id. Pages 413-418. 
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17. On March 23, 2000 the Court denied Mr. Lovato's Motion.16 
18. On April 18, 2000 Mr. Lovato filed a Notice Of Appeal and a Cost Bond.17 
C. Summary of Relevant Facts. The relevant facts as cited in the divorce decree 
are as follows: 
19. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the two minor children with 
primary physical custody awarded to Mr. Lovato subject to Ms. Lovato's liberal visitation..18 
20. It was ruled by the court that Mr. Lovato had a monthly income of $3,153 and Ms. 
Lovato's income was $1,801.19 20 
21. Ms. Lovato was ordered to pay child support to Mr. Lovato in the amount of 
$364.00 per month.21 
22. Mr. Lovato was ordered to maintain health insurance, provide such verification 
to Ms. Lovato yearly, with Ms. Lovato paying lA of all out of pocket expenses and health 
16
 Id. Pages 430-31. 
17
 Id. Pages 452. 
18
 See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 2, para 3 and 4, see also Court Record, 
page 395. 
19
 See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 2-3, para 5 and 6, see also Court 
Record, page 396. 
20
 Both of these income numbers are contested herein. See Argument below. 
21
 See Amended Divorce Decree attached as Appendix "B", page 3-4, para 7-11, see also Court Record, 
page 396. 
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insurance premiums incurred on behalf of the minor children. This amount it was determined 
was $75.39.22 
23. Ms. Lovato's combined child support and insurance premium obligation was 
S439.69.23 
24. Mr. Lovato was ordered to pay any and all marital debts and to hold Ms. Lovato 
harmless against those debts subject to Ms. Lovato paying Vi of medical expenses incurred 
on behalf of the minor children.24 Those debts include the first and second home mortgages 
totaling $ 109,564, and $ 19,609.43 in motor vehicle loans. Both of these debts were incurred 
when the parties were married. 
25. The personal property of the parties were awarded in alternating fashion.25 
26. Each party was awarded a Vi equity interest in the marital home. Total equity was 
determined to be $20,446.26 
27. Mr. Lovato received insurance proceeds resulting from a fire of the marital 
residence after Ms. Lovato left the home. The insurance proceeds were determined to be 
$17,413.58. Mr. Lovato testified at trial that he re-built the home with the help of his friends 
22
 Id., page 4, para 12-13, Id at 397. 
23
 Id., page 4, para 14, Id at 397. 
24
 Id., page 5, para 14, Id at 398. 
25
 Id., page 5, para 18-20, Id at 398. 
26
 Id., page 6-7, para 25, Id at 399. 
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and business associates to save money, that the house was still valued at $130,000 and that 
cash value of some of the proceeds were used for living expenses while he was out of work 
due to illness. Of the $17,416.58 received, the court ruled that $14,913.58 was not expended 
for home repair and awarded lA of that amount, or $7,456.79 to Ms. Lovato.27 
28. Therefore, Ms. Lovato's total ownership interest in the marital residence was 
valued at $15,399.79, i.e., $10,223 in accrued equity plus $7,456.79 in insurance proceeds 
less $2,280 in medical expenses outstanding.28 
29. Ms. Lovato was awarded a lien on the $15,399.79 amount at an interest rate of 
6.513% per annum.29 
30. Ms. Lovato was awarded $400 per month in alimony30 The net difference is 
$39.69. Ms. Lovato was ordered to pay the $39.69 to Mr. Lovato, lA to be paid on the 5th and 
Vi to be paid on the 20th of each month.31 
31. The court awarded alimony, inter alia based on the following: 
o Mr. Lovato was the primary wage earner during the marriage;32 
27
 Id., page 7-8, para 25-31, Id at 400-01. 
28
 Id., page 8, para 31, Id at 401. 
29
 Id., page 8, para 32, Id at 401. 
30
 This effectively nullified any child support awarded to Mr. Lovato. 
31
 Id., page 13-14, para 49-50, Id at 406-407. 
32
 Id., page 9, para 36, Id at 402. 
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o Mr. Lovato's income was greater than Ms. Lovato's;33 
o Mr. Lovato had the ability to increase his income due to a side business;34 
o Ms. Lovato needed to obtain proper housing;35 and, 
o Mr. Lovato's standard of living was higher than Ms. Lovato.36 
32. Again, Mr. Lovato's child support award was to be offset by Ms. Lovato's 
alimony award. The trial court instructed Ms. Lovato to pay Mr. Lovato $39.69 per month.37 
33. Ms. Lovato was awarded Vi of Mr. Lovato's pension plan since the date of the 
marriage. 
34. Ms. Lovato and Mr. Lovato were ordered to share the children as tax exemptions. 
The formula was based on who would benefit the most from the exemptions and paying that 
Vi of that benefit to the non-claiming party.39 This however was amended to be effective as 
of January 1, 2000 whereby each party would take one child as a tax exemption.40 
35. Mr. Lovato was ordered to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees of $11,771.4l 
33
 Id., page 9-10, para 36-39, Id at 402-403. 
Id., page 9, para 37, Id at 402, see also Court Record 479, (transcript), page 7. 
35
 Id., page 11, para 40, Id at 404. 
36
 Id., page 12, para 44, Id at 405. 
37
 Id., page 13-14, para 50, Id at 406-407. 
38
 Id., page 14, para 52-54, Id at 407. 
39
 Id., page 14-15, para 56-58, Id at 407-408. 
40
 See Court Record, page 434-435. 
41
 Id., page 15, para 59-60, Id at 408. 
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IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
36. The Court erred when it ruled that: (1) Mr. Lovato pay Ms. Lovato alimony and 
that this alimony be offset by child support received from Ms. Lovato, (2) Mr. Lovato pay 
Ms. Lovato's attorney fees, (3) Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital home bear interest and (4) 
the insurance proceeds from a house fire was a marital asset. This, in practicable terms, 
resulted in the following: Mr. Lovato was awarded the parties' minor children without child 
support42, responsibility and upkeep of the marital residence without an equity interest,43 re-
build the marital home after a fire with lA of the insurance proceeds necessary to re-build and 
pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees. The resultant inequity is unfair and unjust. 
X, ARGUMENT 
A. EVIDENCE IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY 
AND OFFSET THAT ALIMONY AGAINST CHILD SUPPORT 
37. Elements necessary to determine an award of alimony. The purpose of 
alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage.44 However, when there are limited funds, the alimony 
Mr. Lovato was awarded physical custody of the parties' minor children,; namely Christopher and 
Alexander. See Record, page 395. 
43
 The trial court ruled that Ms. Lovato's interest in the marital residence bear an interest rate of... See... 
44
 Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988). 
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award may, of necessity, fall short of providing the total amount required to maintain the 
spouse at that level.45 The Trial Court shall consider the following factors in determining 
alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's 
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability of the payor to provide support; 
and, (4) the length of the marriage.46 The Trial court did not adequately take into 
consideration evidence regarding the above referenced elements specifically elements (2) and 
(3). 
38. Mr. Lovato's lacks ability to pay alimony. Specifically, the Court's Decree 
TJ36-5147 and other related provisions, incorrectly find (i) that Mr. Lovato's standard of living 
is higher than Ms. Lovato', (ii) that she has a need for alimony to obtain suitable housing to 
meet her parenting responsibilities, and (iii) that Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay alimony 
by reducing his living expenses and by working a second job.48 Those conclusions are in 
error for various reasons, including the following: 
a. The Court improperly reduced Mr. Lovato's transportation expenses. 
^ Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (1985). 
46
 UCA, Section 30-3-5(7). See also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
47
 See Court Record, pages 402-407. 
48
 In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court held that it is 
allowable to take in consideration limits on earnings of the spouse when that spouse has custody of the parties' minor 
children. 
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i. Mr. Lovato's automobile expenses. The Court erroneously 
concluded that Mr. Lovato's $27549 per month automobile expense could be reduced and the 
saving applied toward alimony. Mr. Lovato drives a minimum of 650 miles to work each 
month50 and estimates that he drives a minimum of 200 miles per month transporting the 
children51 to activities, driving to the grocery store, church and for other family purposes, for 
a total of not less than about 850 miles per month. IRS (very conservative) regulations52 fix 
the per mile cost of driving an automobile at 32.50 per mile. Using that rate per mile Mr. 
Lovato's monthly cost is $276,53 which is slightly higher than the $275 listed by Mr. Lovato 
as his monthly automobile expense. As a practical matter, Mr. Lovato's vehicles are old, 
repair and maintenance costs are high. The $275 includes insurance on his vehicles. Mr. 
Lovato's vehicle payments of approximated $560 per month,54 are being paid through his 
bankruptcy and are not included as part of his automobile expense. It is not realistic to 
conclude that Mr. Lovato, with his need to drive to work and to care for the transportation 
49
 The $275 per month automobile expense includes automobile insurance of about $83 per month, which 
leaves only $192 for gasoline, maintenance, repair and depreciation (or replacement cost). 
50
 30 miles round trip each day X 5 = 150 miles per week X 4 1/3 weeks per month = 650 miles per month. 
51
 Mr. Lovato was awarded custody of the parties' minor children. 
52
 Rev. Proc. 97-58. See 1999 U.S. Master Tax Guide § 945, page 275. 
53
 800 miles X 32.5^ = $260. 
54
 Mr. Lovato estimates that his vehicle payments were about $560 per month, however they have not been 
included as automobile expense because they are being paid through his bankruptcy and they are part of his monthly 
payment to the bankruptcy trustee. 
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needs of the minor children, could reasonably reduce his automobile expense and create an 
ability to pay alimony. Mr. Lovato objects to the Court's conclusion that he can reduce his 
automobile expense and thereby create the ability to pay alimony. 
ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's automobile expenses. In 1J39 of the 
Amended Divorce Decree, Ms. Lovato lists her automobile expense as $421 per month. 
After deducting her $251 payment and $60 insurance her net operating cost is $110 for one 
person, as compared with Mr. Lovato' s comparable monthly cost of $ 192 for himself and two 
children. Mr. Lovato's operating costs are also increased because he drives a large van to 
accommodate the needs of the children, while Ms. Lovato drives a smaller vehicle.55 
b. The Court reduced "other expenses". Mr. Lovato's other expenses are 
at a poverty level and can't reasonable be reduced further as suggested by the Court to make 
money available to pay alimony. The children should not be deprived of necessities to 
improve Ms. Lovato's life style. Some examples are as follows: 
i. Mr. Lovato's food and household supplies. Mr. Lovato's food and 
household supply cost is $400 per month for 3 persons, or $ 133 per month, $4.3 8 per day and 
$1.46 per meal per person. The actual amount available for food is less than this amount 
because the $400 also includes household supplies. Ms. Lovato's cost is $250 per month for 
one person, or about $8.22 per day and $2.74 per meal. 
Ms. Lovato drives a compact (small) automobile, which is believed to be a 1998 Mercury Tracer. 
13 - Brief of Appellant 
ii. In contrast, Ms. Lovato's food and expenses. Ms. Lovato is 
allowed $1.28 more per meal than Mr. Lovato and the children. If an expense is to be 
reduced to permit Ms. Lovato to acquire more suitable housing it cannot be by further 
reducing food and household supplies for the children, but should be by reducing Ms. 
Lovato's allowance for those items. 
iii. Mr. Lovato's "other expenses." Mr. Lovato's "other expenses" 
are at a "bare bones" level. He lists only minimal amounts for three persons, while the same 
amount for only one person on her list are much higher. He lists $ 130 for entertainment and 
incidentals, or $43 per person, while she lists $300 for the same items. Funds to pay alimony 
cannot realistically be obtained by further reducing the children's living costs. Mr. Lovato 
objects to the Court's conclusion that funds are available from that source to pay alimony. 
iv. Ms. Lovato's "other expenses." On the other hand, Ms. Lovato's 
expenses can be readily adjusted to provide funds to rent an apartment. For example, if she 
has an apartment where she can visit with and entertain the children, the items marked in the 
chart below with an "*" could readily be applied to pay rent. Ms. Lovato should not have a 
higher standard of living than Mr. Lovato. Items marked in the chart below with a "~" sign 
have been adjusted to the same per-person amount as has been allowed to Mr. Lovato and 
the children. If reductions in living standards are to be made to assist Ms. Lovato to obtain 
an apartment the reductions should apply equally to Mr. Lovato. If those adjustments are 
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made Ms. Lovato will have about $651 per month available to pay rent or for other purposes, 
as demonstrated below: 
Rent (now being paid) $ 200* 
Entertainment (now $200-adj. to $33) 167*-
Incidentals (now $ 100 - adj. To $ 10) 90*~ 
Storage (unnecessary w/apt.) 57* 
Clothing (Now $30-adj. to $ 10) 20-
Food ($250-adj. to $133) 117-
Total reduction in expenses $ 651 
c. The lower court overstated of Ms, Lovato's expenses. Ms. Lovato's 
monthly living expenses are overstated by $ 131.44. Ms. Lovato lists child support payments 
as $317.16 and children's medical as $75.59, for a total of $392.75. However, Ms. Lovato 
under the prior order has only paid $261.31 per month, which results in a $131.44 
overstatement of her monthly living expenses. Without considering the $651 overstatement 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, at a minimum to correct said $131.44 error, the 
$1,825.75 total expenses listed in f 39 of the Decree should be corrected to $1,694.31. 
d. Attorney fees not included in total living expenses of Mr. Lovato. In fflf 
59 and 60 of the Amended Decree of Divorce56 the Court concludes that Mr. Lovato must 
pay attorney fees of not less than $19,811,57 an overwhelming task. If he were able to pay 
56
 See Court Record, page 408. 
57
 Not less than $8,040 fees incurred by Mr. Lovato and $11, 771 incurred by Ms. Lovato, a total of 
$19,811. Actual fees owed by Mr. Lovato to his attorney are now several thousand dollars higher as a result of post-
trial work. 
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even $100 per month to each attorney, a total of $200 per month,58 and if no interest were 
charged, it would take about 99 months or 4 Vi years to pay the attorney fees. If Mr. Lovato 
is unable to work out satisfactory arrangements for payment of attorney fees he would be 
required to somehow include those payments in his pending bankruptcy, which will 
substantially increase the monthly payment to the bankruptcy trustee and further reduce his 
ability to pay alimony. As a practical matter, award to Ms. Lovato of her attorney fees 
makes payment of alimony virtually impossible. Therefore, Mr. Lovato is not in a better 
financial position to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees," and not supported by the evidence, an 
abuse of discretion and because as a practical matter he simply lacks the ability to pay her 
attorney fees. 
e. Available funds; error in lower Court's computation. In f 41 of the 
Amended Decree59 the Court's computations may be in error. Mr. Lovato's bi-weekly pay 
is $ 1,434.02, not $ 1,484.90. If we reduce that amount by the $30 tool allowance, the net bi-
weekly amount is $ 1,404.02. If we multiply that by the 26 pay periods in a year, his annual 
income is $36,504.52 - 12 months = $3,042.04 instead of the $3,253 computed by the Court 
as stated in f 41 of the Decree, an overstatement in Mr. Lovato's income of $210.96 per 
month. 
58
 It appears that realistically Mr. Lovato may be able to pay a total of only $100 per month on fees, which 
would take about 8 1/4 years. 
59
 See Court Record, page 404, see also Court Record 479, (Transcript) page 3-6. 
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f. Corrected child support. The corrected child support to be paid by Ms. 
Lovato based on the child support worksheet is $322.66 and her total payment including 
medical is then $439.33. 
g. Mr. Lovato's corrected income. Correcting Mr. Lovato's income results 
in changes in ^  43 of the Decree as follows: The net income would be changed to $2,467.85, 
the child support and medical reimbursement is changed to $439.33 and the total net monthly 
income is changed to $2,907.18. 
h. FICA payroll tax deductions. The Court's decision incorrectly fails to 
deduct FICA taxes of $194.5760 paid by Mr. Lovato. That $194.57 should be deducted from 
Mr. Lovato's income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his 
ability to pay alimony. 
i. Utah income tax payments. Mr. Lovato's 1998 Utah income tax was $275, 
or about $22.92 per month. Utah withholding tax was $87.4961 per month. Whichever 
amount the Court decides to use, that amount should be deducted from Mr. Lovato's income 
to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony. 
See para 41 of Amended Divorce Decree - FICA taxes should be $89.80 [$17.02 & $72.78] were 
deducted from his bi-weekly check, X 26 pay periods = $2,334.80 per year •*- 12 months = 194.57 per month as 
determined at trial. 
61
 Bi-weekly Utah withholding tax is $40.38 X 26 pay periods per year = $1,049.88 per year + 12 months 
= $87.49 per month. 
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j . Mr. Lovato's net available funds. In H 43 of the Decree, the Court has 
incorrectly determined that Mr. Lovato has $3,043 of available funds from which to pay his 
monthly expenses. The amount of Mr. Lovato's available funds stated in 143 of the Decree 
should be changed from $3,043 to $2,492.93, computed as follows: 
Corrected monthly income ffl 39(e) above] $3,042.04 
Add: corrected child support ffl 39(f) 439.33 
Total available funds before deductions 3,481.37 
Deductions: 
Deduction per Court ffi 42 & 43 of Decree] $ 574.19 
Federal income tax withheld ffl 39(h)] 132.19 
FICA taxes ffl 39(i) 194.57 
Utah income taxes ffi 390) 87.4962 
Corrected deductions $ 988.44 
Corrected net available funds $2,492.93 
k. Mr. Lovato's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney fees. The 
Court should modify the Decree, f^ 43 to state that in addition to the $3,043 of monthly 
expenses listed therein, that Mr. Lovato will be required to pay additional amount on attorney 
fees, or an increased amount to the bankruptcy trustee if he is unable to work out a 
reasonable payment arrangement with the two attorneys and is required to include those 
obligations in his bankruptcy. 
62
 If we use Ms. Lovato's 1998 income taxes of Utah $275 [Ex. 6], then Mr. Lovato's Utah income tax 
would be $22.29 per month and the corrected net available funds would be $2,558.13. 
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1. Imputed income. In [^44 of the Decree, the Court concludes that there is 
insufficient evidence to impute additional income to Mr. Lovato, but then attempts to justify 
the award of alimony by actually imputing income to him by its finding that Mr. Lovato 
should be able to generate income from a second job from which to pay alimony.63 Counsel 
for Mr. Lovato has been unable to locate any authority for the proposition that a husband 
should be ordered to take a second job to pay alimony to his wife, particularly where, as here, 
where he has physical custody of the children and his income is insufficient to meet the basic 
needs of himself and of the children of the parties. Also, Mr. Lovato's ability to hold a 
second job is severely restricted by his need to care for the two children of the marriage. The 
purpose of alimony is to attempt to equalize the ability of the parties to go forward with their 
lives.64 The Court has addressed only Ms. Lovato's alleged needs, not the ability of each 
party to go forward with their lives. 
m. Paying alimony instead of court ordered payments to bankruptcy 
trustee. The Court erred in its determination in If 46 of the Decree that Mr. Lovato should 
pay alimony instead of making his payments to the bankruptcy trustee. Ability to pay is a 
major factor in determining whether alimony should be awarded.65 If Mr. Lovato fails to 
See also Court Record 479 (Transcript), page 7. 
Howell v. Howell 817 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1991) 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) 
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make his payment to the bankruptcy trustee his bankruptcy will be dismissed, the home and 
vehicle mortgages will be foreclosed, his wages will be garnisheed and he will be unable to 
support the children or to pay alimony. The Court's finding that alimony should be paid by 
Mr. Lovato in view of his limited income, the cost of supporting the children, his bankruptcy, 
etc. is in error, and that error is compounded by the Court's finding that Mr. Lovato should 
pay alimony instead of making court ordered payments to the bankruptcy trustee. This case 
is factually similar to that in Endrody66 where health problems, and child care responsibilities 
hampered his ability to return to his former occupation. 
n. Ms. Lovato's work history. The lower court further erred when it 
concluded that Mr. Lovato, in Tf 44, has the ability to earn a much greater income, and that 
Ms. Lovato allegedly has not been employed and that she has a limited earning capacity. To 
the contrary, she has been heavily involved in the craft and housecleaning business for many 
years and has earned substantial amounts of income. She is in good health, has no 
dependents, and can work a second job without interfering with family responsibilities, as 
would not be the case with Mr. Lovato if he worked a second job. Her full time job 
supplements her other business activities. The finding as stated is misleading and incorrect. 
o. Equalizing standard of living. Mr. Lovato objects to Decree f 49 
because it misstates the evidence and facts. If the parties standard of living and income were 
66
 Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ap. 1996). 
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to be equalized, it would be necessary for Ms. Lovato to pay alimony to Mr. Lovato. See 
chart immediately below and discussion following that chart. 
p. Funds available to parties. The following summary demonstrates Mr. 
Lovato's inability to pay and the inequality which will result from the Court's alimony order: 
Funds available to each party is as follows: 
Total 
income 
G r o s s i n c o m e ft[ 44 & 39 of Decree] 
Child support & medical [worksheet] 
Alimony [j[49 of decree] 
Adjusted income [per decree] 
Corrections: 
Mr. Lovato's income 68 
F I C A t ax [if 2(e)(4) above] 
Utah withholding69 
Correction of support [worksheet] 
Fed. withholding tax71 
$5,567.00 
- 0 -
- 0 -
5.567.00 
Husband's 
Income 
$ 3,253.00 
439.69 
( 400.00) 
Wife's 
Income 
$2,314.0067 
( 439.69) 
400.00 
3.292.69 2.274.31 
( 
( 
( 
10 
L 
210.96) 
194.57) 
134.33) 
- 0 - ( 
128.00) 
( 
( 
( 
( . 
210.96) 
194.57) 
134.33) 
.91) 
128.00) _ 
- 0 -
- 0 -
- 0 -
.91 
67 See f38 of the Decree. 
/TO 
This $210.96 reduction in Mr. Lovato's monthly earnings, as shown in ^ 52 of the Findings and f 41 and 
43 of the Decree, where the Court concluded that $2,643.09 is Mr. Lovato's monthly income, before adding $439.69 
of child support and medical payments to be paid by Ms. Lovato to Mr. Lovato. See ^ 2(e) (above) where Mr. 
Lovato asks the Court to correct that error. 
The corrected computation is as follows: $1,434.02 per week - $30 tool allowance = $1,404.02 X 26 pay 
periods per year = $36,504.52 - 12 month = $3,042.04 per month. This is $210.96 less than the $3,253 per month 
shown in f 52 of the Findings and If 41 of the Decree. 
Utah withhold tax on bi-weekly earnings of $1,300.93 with three (3) exemptions is $62 x 26 pay periods 
in a year = $1,612 per year -M2 = $134.33 per month. This amount has been used in the foregoing computation. 
The corrected child support worksheet shows a total obligation of $439.33 instead of $439.69 used by 
the Court in f 52 of the Findings and f 43 of the decree, a decrease of 910. 
71 
This is the monthly Federal withholding tax shown on Mr. Lovato's pay stub, converted from bi-weekly 
to monthly. This amount is small because Mr. Lovato claimed ten (10) exemptions. He will now only be entitled to 
three (3) exemptions, which will increase his the amount withheld from his paycheck. Mr. Lovato's bi-weekly 
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Total corrections 667.86 ( 668.77) .91 
Income after corrections $4,899.14 $2,623.92 $2,275.22 
Total Husband's Wife's 
income Income Income 
Income after corrections (Prior page) $4,899.14 $2,623.92 $2,275.22 
Less: Debt Service 1,603.00 L603.0072 - 0 -
Net funds available to each party 3,296.14 1,020.92 2,275.2273 
Monthly living exp. [if 43 & 39 of decree] 3,266.75 L440.0074 L826.7575 
Monthly surplus or (deficit) with alimony $ 29.39 ($ 419.08) $ 448.47* 
Monthly surplus or (deficit) w/o alimony $ 29.39 ($ 19.08) $ 48.47 
Federal withholding tax will be $128 with three exemptions [Mr. Lovato & 2 children] with a taxable income of 
$1,300.93 shown in IRS Circular E. If we convert that to a monthly basis, Mr. Lovato's federal withholding tax will 
be $128 per month, which is the amount we have used above. 
As noted in K 39 above, if Mr. Lovato's income tax liability is reduced because he claims the children as 
exemptions and receives the earned income credit, and he is then required to pay to Ms. Lovato lA of the income tax 
savings resulting from his claiming all of the children, he will then have a net income tax liability at least equal to lA 
of the amount he pays to Ms. Lovato. He should be allowed credit for income tax which he is paying through 
withholding. Ms. Lovato will, in effect, receive her share of any income tax refund from the tax savings which in ^ 
56 in the Decree, the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to pay to Ms. Lovato. 
72 
73 
Mr. Lovato's debt service is as follows: 
Country Wide Home Loans - 1st mortgage $ 861 
Salt Lake City Credit Union - 2nd mortgage 139 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee 598 
Total monthly payments $1,603 
SeeH55&56above. 
74
 In 43 of the Decree, the Court found Mr. Lovato's Monthly Living Expenses to be $3,043. However, 
since $1,603 of debt service has been deducted above, Mr. Lovato's Monthly Living Expenses has been reduced to 
$1,440 [$3,043 - $1,603 = $1,440]. 
75
 The Court has allowed Ms. Lovato $1,826 for living expenses for one person, and only $1,440 for three 
persons, or an average of $480 per person. This means that Ms. Lovato is being allowed $1,346 per month more for 
living expenses than is being allowed to Mr. Lovato and each of the children. As note in U 39 above, if Ms. Lovato 
were required to reduce her monthly living expenses to the same amount as is being allowed to each of the Mr. 
Lovato and the two children, she would have an extra $651 available, which would more than sufficient to rent a 
suitable apartment. 
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39. Alimony should be paid to Mr. Lovato. If we add to Mr. Lovato's debt service 
a reasonable monthly payment toward his own attorney fees of over $11,00076 and the 
$11,771 the Court has ordered him to pay toward Ms. Lovato's attorney fees, the result will 
be to deprive the family of bare necessities. The children should not be required to suffer in 
order to permit Ms. Lovato to have a higher standard of living. If, it is the Court's intent is 
to equalize the available funds between the parties, as it has ruled in 1 44, 49, etc. of the 
decree as proposed by Ms. Lovato, it would be necessary to order Ms. Lovato to pay alimony 
to Mr. Lovato to assist him in meeting his crushing financial obligations required to support 
himself and the two children. This is clearly not a case where alimony or attorney fees 
should be awarded to Ms. Lovato.77 
40. Further, "alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is 
disparity between the parties' incomes."78 An underlying factor regarding the payor 
spouse's ability to provide support is the payor spouse's financial need. "The payor spouses 
reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to provide 
In f 59 of the proposed decree, the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to pay his own attorney fees, which 
were then $8,040. Post-trial services have increased that obligation to over $11,000. 
77 
If the $400 per month alimony is disallowed, then Mr. Lovato would have a monthly deficit of about $20 
and Ms. Lovato would have a monthly surplus of about $50. However, the foregoing computations do not consider 
the fact that the Court has ordered Mr. Lovato to also pay Ms. Lovato $11,771 in attorney fees. In addition to his own 
fees of $8,040, a total of over $ 19,811. Mr. Lovato simply has no money with which to pay alimony or Ms. Lovato's 
attorney fees. 
78
 Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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support." In awarding alimony the court must review the payor spouses ability to provide 
support. It requires more than the court stating "the defendant has the ability to pay."80 
Alimony awards must also be made in light of debts assigned to each of the parties. The 
court should factor in a party's share of the debt when calculating the alimony award. 81 In 
essence, the Court's Decree f 44, and other related provisions, incorrectly found: (i) that Mr. 
Lovato's standard ofliving is higher than Ms. Lovato,' (ii) that she has a need for alimony 
to obtain suitable housing to meet her parenting responsibilities, and (iii) that Mr. Lovato 
has the ability to pay alimony by reducing his living expenses, and by working a second job. 
41. The Court improperly offset the child support award with alimony. 
a. Child support is exempt. UCA § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(vi) exempts child support 
from execution. The Court's offset of alimony against child support is, in effect, an execution 
(set-off) of Respondent's claim for alimony82 against exempt child support. The set-off 
violates said exemption for child support. 
b. Set-off disallowed against claim in different capacity. The right of 
minor children to support cannot be "bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way 
79
 Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 & n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
80
 Chambers v.Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
81
 Willey v. Willey, 866 p.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
82
 Although alimony is also exempt under UCA § 78-23-6(1), one exemption cannot be offset against the 
other, particularly where as here child support is paid to Petitioner in his capacity as custodial parent and alimony is 
owed in his individual capacity. 
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defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents."83 It is well established that the child 
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child not the parent.84 Further, child support 
is paid to Mr. Lovato in his capacity as custodial parent and alimony is owed in his individual 
capacity.85 The Court erred in allowing a set-off of alimony owed by Mr. Lovato in his 
individual capacity against child support receiver by Petitioner in a fiduciary and/or custodial 
capacity. A set-off is allowed only when there is a mutual debt owing by the debtor and 
creditor while acting in the same capacity. In First Security86 the Utah Supreme Court did 
not permit the bank to offset funds received in a fiduciary capacity against funds in an 
individual capacity, citing lack of mutuality of obligation. In a like manner, in 77mm87 the 
Utah Supreme Court did not allow a counterclaim individually against a plaintiff who was 
State of Utah, Department of Human Resources v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1997) citing Hills 
v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981). 
84
 Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
85 
A custodial parent is merely trustee of support payments and, therefore, has no right to contract away 
benefits of trust. Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E. 2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App 4th Dist. 1984). 
86
 First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 620 P.2d 329 at 332-333 (Utah 1980). See 
also Alvord v. Ryan, 212 F. 83 (CCA 8 (Utah (1914); In re Peterson Distributing, Inc., 82 F.3d 959 C.A. 10 (Utah 
1996); Reich v. Davison Lumber Sales, Inc., Employees Retirement Plan, 154 B.R. 324 (D. Utah 1993); Mark VII 
Financial Consultants Corporation v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130 at 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Ron Case Roofing and 
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382 at 1388 (Utah 1989) 
87
 Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). 
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suing in his capacity as trustee.88 In Cook89 an obligation in a fiduciary capacity was not 
allowed as an offset against an obligation in an individual capacity. In 
c. Failure to pay alimony does not affect obligation to support children. 
By reason of his financial problems, his bankruptcy, the cost of supporting the children, etc. 
Mr. Lovato will probably have difficulty surviving financially. If, for any reason, Mr. 
Lovato is unable to pay alimony in full, that does not affect Ms. Lovato's duty to contribute 
toward support of the children.90 The Court's set-off of alimony against child support make 
the children the guarantor of payment of alimony. The Court has sufficient remedies 
available to enforce payment of alimony without imposing that obligation on the children. 
The Court has improperly netted $400 of alimony received by him as custodian of the 
children, against child support of about $438.42 owed by him in his individual capacity, and 
has thereby improperly reduced Respondent's payment to a net of about $38. 
B. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COURT'S AWARD TO MS. LOVATO OF ATTORNEY FEES 
42. Petitioner lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney fees. The lower 
court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Lovatoto pay $11,771 toward Ms. Lovato's 
88
 See annotation Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child 
support payments, 11 A.L.R. 5th 259; Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation § 618 Setoff against alimony. 
89
 Cook v. Jones, 206 P.2d 630 (Utah 1949). 
90
 Siegel v. Siegel, 400 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1979) [misconduct on the part of the custodial parent should not 
operate to deprive a child of support]. Violation of custody or visitation provisions of agreement or decree as 
affecting child support payments provisions, and vice versa. 5 A.L.R. 2d 118, § 6(a). 
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attorney fees. "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees."91 For the reasons discussed in above, it is clear that 
Mr. Lovato lacks the ability to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees. She is in the better financial 
circumstance to pay her attorney fees. Although Mr. Lovato is in bankruptcy, he must pay 
his own fees, which approximate the amount of Ms. Lovato's fees. To add $11,000 to that 
obligation makes it unrealistic to assume that Mr. Lovato could pay Ms. Lovato's fees. As 
demonstrated above, Mr. Lovato simply has no funds with which to pay either his fees or Ms. 
Lovato's fees. On the other hand, Ms. Lovato is single, has no dependents, and has a 
minimal child support payment due to the offset against alimony. She has (if in effect) been 
ordered to pay only a net of $39.69 toward supporting the children. She has the ability to 
resume her house cleaning business or to increase her craft business income by working a 
few extra hours each week. On the other hand, Mr. Lovato's ability to work a second job is 
impaired because of he is the primary caretaker of the party's two minor children. If Mr. 
Lovato is required to obtain a second job this will diminish the time he is able to spend caring 
for the children, helping them with the school work, preparing meals, supervising their 
activities, and doing all of the things that a good parent needs to do for teen-age children. 
91
 Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 WL 135308, 1,3, (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, (Utah 
Ct. App. 2001) quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). 
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The children need Mr. Lovato even more because of the divorce. It is not appropriate to 
require Mr. Lovato be away from the children working a second job so Ms. Lovato without 
those responsibilities can enjoy a better standard of living. "The decision to award attorney 
fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial 
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees."92 
43. Inadequate findings to support divorce decree. "Moreover, '[s]uch an award 
[attorney fees] must be based on sufficient findings' regarding these factors. Our supreme 
court has stressed, 'The trial court... must make findings of fact explicit in support of its 
legal conclusions... Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate 
review."93 The Utah Court of Appeals as also stated "unless the record clearly and un-
controvertedly supports the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate finding of fact 
ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the court."94 In the instant case, the 
Findings regarding award of attorney fees read as follows: 
51. Petitioner should assume and pay his own attorney's fees. 
92
 Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 WL 135308, 1,3, (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, (Utah 
Ct. App. 2001) quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). 
93
 Id., at 3, quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) and Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230 (Utah 1997). 
94
 Id. at 3, quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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52. It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the 
services of an attorney to represent her in this action which has 
been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming because 
of Petitioner's domestic violence against Respondent, his 
financial and visitation demands on Respondent, and his 
unwillingness to make reasonable efforts toward settlement. 
Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's 
attorney fees and he should be required to pay the Respondent's 
attorney fees and costs of at least $8,995.95 
The Decree states as follows: 
59. Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees, 
which have amounted to at least $8,040. 
60. As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay 
Respondent's attorney fees, he shall pay Respondent's 
attorney's fees and costs of $11,771 upon a showing of the 
reasonableness of the same.96 
44. The above findings and decree are insufficient to base an award of attorney 
fees to one party or the other. Without more, stating that the Petitioner is in a better 
position to pay more than $18,000 in attorney fees is totally inadequate. No consideration 
is given to Ms. Lovato's need or detailing Mr. Lovato's ability to pay. Instead, the trial court 
punishes Mr. Lovato for attempting to protect his constitutional right in litigating this matter. 
Punishment instead of ability to pay is the standard by which the trial court determined who 
should pay attorney fees. This issue should be remanded to the trial court ordering each party 
to pay their own attorney fees. 
See Court Record, page 346. 
See Court Record, page 408. 
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C. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COURT'S AWARD TO MS. LOVATO OF INTEREST ON 
HER EQUITY IN THE MARITAL RESIDENCE 
45. Under Utah law, interest should not accrue on Ms. Lovato's lien. Even 
though Ms. Lovato did not request interest on the home equity, in ^ f 32 of the of the Amended 
Divorce Decree, the Court awarded interest at the 6.513% statutory post-judgment rate on 
Ms. Lovato's $15,399.70 lien on the family home.97 In Osguthorpe9* the Appellate Court 
affirmed denial of interest on divorce liens, and held as follows: 
According to Section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other than 
those rendered on a lawful contract, shall bear interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum." In addition, the trial court in a 
divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest on 
a judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 
905, 906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable lien, unlike a 
judgment, only gives the lien-holder a right to collect the 
debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., 
N. V.f 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgement on the other 
hand, is "the final consideration and determination of a court on 
matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. (Emphasis 
added). 
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the 
Chris Lane home subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien 
in favor of defendant for one-half of the present equity in the 
home. The court stated that the lien amount should be $22,500 
See Court Record, page 401. 
98
 Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah App. 1990). 
99
 Utah rate of interest on judgment as provided by UCA § 15-1-4 was reduced effective 5/3/93. See 
Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 1999 (Utah Ct. App 1999). 
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«;K; , . u t i j ;:•*: ;....-. u defend-;*^ •-•. i^ ,*, ^..UHMII: icinanies, 
cohabits, sells the home, move:- from the home, or when the 
youngest child :caches the age of majority, whichever occurs 
first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not been 
reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was aw arded an 
equitable lien to which interest does not attach under section 
15-1-4. We therefor affirm the trial court's award to defendant 
of a non-interest bearing equitable lien m \h* parties* propem 
for $22,500. (Emphasis a^ « v < -
46. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equit 
• y 
reason interest could properly be awarded on a divorce created lien on marital property, it is 
an abu^e oi discretion to do so in this case, because with interest Ms. Lovato is awarded 
$1,623 i nore thai I tl I 3 li ill e qi lit ; in: I the home, con lputed as follows: 
Value o f huilit - .-.*:ree1| ">,:"»| $ 
(1) Unpaid trust deeds on home: (Decree. % 25) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Countrywide Home Mtu. 
Salt Lake Credit I iv •: 
Total mortgage nens 
Ngt equity 
Lien awarded to Respondent 
Petitioner's remaining equity 
Interest on $15,400 @ 6.513 [n ] 
thru 6/24/06100 = 
Petitioner's negative equity in home 
$100,156 
9.398 
101O34 
Jf i -I4r 
15.40(1 
*v-4( 
6.669 
$_L-623 
100 Bel ween n 1 vv ana o Z4-06 is 2,42 7 days. . 
J 1,003 per year - 365 = $2,748 per day X 2,427 days = $6 
nerest on $15,400 @ 6.513% per annum. = 
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If the interest award remains it in effect it nullifies any interest that the Mr. Lovato has in the 
marital residence. In essence, Mr. Lovato may continue to live in the home, pay taxes and 
upkeep, pay off the mortgage and receive no present equity position in the house. The award 
of interest is clearly an abuse of discretion. 
D. EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF Vi OF INSURANCE 
PROCEEDS TO MS. LOVATO 
47. The trial court awarded Vi of insurance proceeds received as a result of a fire 
on the premise after the Lovato's were separated. In f 41 of the Findings and ^  26 and 31 
of the proposed Decree, the Court incorrectly held that $14,913.58 of insurance proceeds 
from a fire was a marital asset, awarded Ms. Lovato $7,456.79 as one-half of that amount, 
and included it as part of Ms. Lovato's lien on the home. Before the fire the parties owned 
a home which was worth $130,000. After the home was repaired by Mr. Lovato and others 
who assisted him, it was still worth $130,000. The court awarded Vi of the $130,000 to Ms. 
Lovato. By also awarding her a lien for $7,456.79 (plus interest) as Vi of the unused 
insurance proceeds, Ms. Lovato realized a $7,500 windfall. If Mr. Lovato had done all of 
the work himself, which work was done after the parties separated,101 surely it could not 
reasonably be argued that Ms. Lovato was entitled to share in the value of his work. The 
Court found that on separation the parties ended their economic partnership. From and after 
101
 The Court fixed the date of separation as the date for valuation of the marital estate. See f 2 of the 
Amended Decree. 
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t h a t ( i ' l t c l l n 1 l i n n i r * s . r . , i n c f l n I, u n i t n i l I) I in I  n . i fo I \ I". Il n '.illo i,1,, in ml iMil'illii'i! In a 
windfall by sharing in insurance proceeds which were not part of the marital esiau '- fact 
that others assisted him with the work and expense does not change the situation. 
i o n a t e r a l source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for fire damage 
• - < uuinuge repairs were made by ]\ Ir. 
Lovato and others w ho assisted him. Ms, 1 o\;i1n is nol rnt i l lnl to m r m * i n nnllnM Inviiuse 
Mr. Lovato did not employ a contractor and pay him for the repairs, but instead obtained 
repairs .lomhi.- i •. .m ; o: source ." That "collateral source / ' labor generated solely by Mr. 
I -ovate I1"1" Is I o \ • at : • is not entitl ;xi to si lai e In Dubois v Nye10 ; at page 825 the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled: 
The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not 
entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, r educed by 
proof t h a t t he plaintiff has m , r , In „"" ill ' in » nil leccive 
compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent 
collateral source. (Emphasis added). 
4() To aw'riril I 1.1""« I in. ul'ii ;i s lmrr ni-l" In r IIIMII in i -i |hi u\ r eds because the r epa i r s 
\ 'I IT m a d e f rom a "Collateral Source" is a c lear violation of 
1997 Gibbs M Smith, hu\ w U S. Fidelity103 case at page 345 the Utah Supreme Court 
Kregoing language with approval .\ppi>uiL. , mh I ,aw in 1994 the 10th Circuit 
102
 Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978). 
103
 Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (' I Hah I W ) . 
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Court of Appeals FDIC104 case of cited the Gibbs case with approval. The "Collateral 
Source" doctrine is still the Law in Utah. 
XL CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein this Court should reverse trial court's decision and, inter 
alia, (1) eliminate the award of alimony, (2) eliminate the award for attorney fees in favor 
of Ms. Lovato, (3) eliminate the award of Ms. Lovato's fire insurance proceeds, and 
eliminate interest award on Ms. Lovato's lien on the marital residence and for such other 
relief as this Court deems necessary and proper. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Thomas E. Stamos 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, and/or to be hand delivered, this ^ # ^ day of March, 2001, to the following 
person as the address stated: 
Monica Z. Kelley, Esq. 
KELLEY & KELLEY 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FDIC v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 20 F. 3rd 1070, 1083 (10th Cir. Utah 1994). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
1 "i 11 I i) I I N V1 I 1, \ K )• (I > I > I \ , S I ATF OF UTAH 
EDWARD F. LO\ATO. 
Petitione: 
vs. 
PF1KA LK A ! « \ 
Respondent 
Respondent Petra Lovato. by .and through her counsel of record, Monica Kelley, hereby 
submits her Proposed Findings of Fact and Concisions «>f' w im tf-u fmiti ' "isiH?r:Mn" is (his 
matter is set for bench trial on September 3, 1999. 
Marital History' 
1. Petitioner .and Respondent were married on May 26. 1984 and were married for 13 
2. At the recommendation of the Honorable Pat Brian and in furtherance of the 
:• i :i vc, :i ience of the parties', the Court bifurcated the divorce proceeding and the Order for Bifurcation 
and Decree of Divorce based on irreconcilable differences ^ ,i t« « i r ' H HI VLi I |l|iul1 ', ".JI i he, 
) RE3Pe?fl)E?rr5 PROPOSES 
FINDINGS OF FACT AM) 
39^ 
) 
) 
) Civil No. 974904424DA 
) Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
) Commissioner Thomas N. Ai nett 
the parties had been married almost 14 years. 
3. At the time the bifurcation was ordered no determination was made as to when the 
marital estate would be valued, and the parties would have been married more than 15 years in 
September 9, 1999. 
Child Custody, Visitation and Support: 
4. The parties have two minor children born as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian 
Lovato, age 13 born April 18, 1986, and Alexander Daniel Lovato. age 11 born June 24. 1988. 
5. There are no other proceedings regarding the children's custody pending in a court of 
this state or any other state. 
6. The parties should be awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, with the 
primary physical custody awarded to the Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal 
right to visit with the minor children. 
7. Visitation should occur as the parties agree. If they are unable to agree, visitation 
should occur according to the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35 and the parties should 
incorporate the Advisory Guidelines for visitation found in UCA 30-3-33 in their visitation practices. 
8. Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a salary of S3.217 
per month gross income. In addition, he supplements his income through work at his auto body shop 
which he operates to earns an additional income of S 1,500 per month. 
9. Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns S8.95 per hour, or SI.551 
per month gross income. In addition, she supplements her income through her craft booth business 
and earns an additional income of $250 per month. 
1 1 . Pu r suan t In 1 ' i \ M|s I ^ " r\ o j I l'<: " .Lk. J I lHii t lnl j n j icu.Mili.iMt' aiiil prupci ihut 
the Respondent be ordered to pay Petitioner :LS v-r.iid -i.ir--)n *: :T4 ^o -*er month which calculates the 
par ties child support obligation according u, :::-J . mi^rm v_rA;u. support Guidelines and income from 
one full-time job. Respondent's child support obligation should conunue until the vounr?st nf fhr« 
minor children becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from, high school during the child's normal 
and expected ;; -ear • :)f gradi i ation vhi * • IP hirt" Responaem 3 uinu Luppun obh^iuon 
should be recalculated as provided for by law. and at minimum when the eldest child aims 18 years of 
jge. MI has graduated Ironi high >M.[II>U1 .luring thai ehiic > normal and expected year 01
 c.:aJuatk:r,. 
whichever occurs later. Each of the parties should be 'under mutual obligation to notify*+". r*--
uithin ten (l()i da) s of am change in monthly income. 
10. Respondent's base child si ipport award sha 11 be ["educed by 50° b for each child foi time 
periods during which the child is with 'the noncustodial parent by order of the court or b> written 
agreerru»ni nf thr p irii^, tor it )r ti! "u ^1 JL\V> I »1 1 HLA\ A : da; s. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day 
raiuuiMrient. 
I I Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one ha If by the fifth d ay 
'i Lmv rnontii ana one tiair b\ the twentieth day of every month, or otherwise as. the parties may 
agree. 
Respondent has paid temporary" child support through the pendency of this action and 
has no cm!: -.: -
.* arsuanttei. C A ~ M > " 1
 v
 U:J us amended), Petitioner shall maintain insuran :: e 
for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner should provide verification 
of coverage to the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to 
the Respondent each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of 
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or 
should have known of the change. 
14. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid b\ 
a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be calculated by dividing 
the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently, Petitioner maintains the health 
insurance coverage for the minor children, but pays no out of pocket monthly premium expense. 
15. Both parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and copayments. incurred for the minor children and actually paid by 
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
16. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parents share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the 
above verification requirements. 
17. The children are of an age and maturity where they do not require the supervision of 
day care provider. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations: 
18. Throughout the parties marriage. Petitioner was the primary income earner and 
regularly worked more than one full time job to support the family financially. Respondent was a 
stay-at-home parent who worked odd jobs and maintained a small craft business to supplement the 
family income. 
jc^ At the time of separate m flu' rMrin/s OUTV 1 ihf Inlluwmi nnni ilrb! i nil mi"1'. iHih 
Home mortgage for the marital residence, John Paras Furniture for household furniture. Granite 
..n? room set, and a van automobile loan. 
All debt should be awaroej u °j:it;or.er as h* * o^V md e> -"'u^ ** -^nligation, and he should be ordered 
iu liuli.1 Kcsfinndciii harmless on these debts and obligations ;<,;. Dz blowing reasons: These debts are 
included with Petitioner's bankruptcy petition.and are \ 
Petitioner under this divorce. Had the parties remained married, these debts would have been paid 
from Petitioner's income fmm his i»mpiv*v n m r fi wi;, \iw pi iiiun iijuiine eoinj; i null;.. 
Respondent lacks the ability to pay these debts. 
'() 'V'UK'ner • ."HILUUUU i,' pa;, these marital debts should be deemed his obligation in 
'"eu o additional srv.vusa: support and as such should be non-discharrrear 
.._ . x /eun^.v; .. ^anKruptcy petition filed in the United States Banxruptc*. L our.. Case V g8-
32926 should be Petitioner's sole and exclusiu* nhiu'nrun n > pn1 .mil lit; -jhuuld liuld Re 4 Hinder)! 
harmless thereon. 
21. Petitioner ^' % • - * . . J:, _: ;_: ; ; .IJSTA^SS 
from liabili*v rr. a!I debts x:c orugauons incurred n> the parties prior to their date of separation in 
August : " * « - - • s contracted bv the parties should be the 
responsibility of the part)' who incurred the particular debt. 
22. Respondent should be 'ordered to assume and pay, and hold Petitioner harmless from 
5 
liability on, any and all debts and obligations incurred by her since August 1997. 
Provisions Relating to Personal Property: 
23. During the marriage, the parties acquired certain items of personal property. Said 
personal property should be awarded to the parties as follows. 
24. To Petitioner: 
Most household appliances, electronics, shop tools, furniture, pictures, old living room 
set with all its tables, boy's bedroom furniture. 1994 GMC Van. 1965 Pontiac, 1988 
Dodge Caravan and other personal property identified on Petitioner's bankruptcy 
petition valued at $12,290. 
25. To Respondent:-
BEDROOM AND MISCELLANEOUS 
Chest from bedroom 
Mrs. Thomas's little couch 
Swag from bedroom 
Picture from bathroom and wreath 
Dryer 
LIVING ROOM 
3 new couches 
Wicker stand with all its ornaments 
Large tulip crate and doilies 
Wall pictures including large one 
Hanging plants 
FAMILY ROOM 
r . v • > : v 
Shelves with their ornaments 
RouiiiJ tabli: viul'i luirs 
Share of children's photos and videos 
KITCHEN 
Half of pots and pan-; ninr * M..:P< ^luir"'w:>re e:c. 
Baking sheets and bouls. Recipe books 
*"."
 ,h
'
H11[ m j k
 '*
ri f
 ""
M
 :c Lneoii- wOokmi nems 
RESPONDENT'S OFFICE 
• .:_:;-.. picture copies, frame samples 
Clothes in closet • • : 
Brown vacuum cleaner 
PANTRY 
Some of church's canned food supplies 
Won11 .irn'i i:r,:iti :-pp!'c , 
Old records 
U)RR SHOP 
Scroll machine 
Band saw machine 
i 
All craft supplies including iron flower holder, Christmas greenery, ribbons and ribbon 
holder, spray cans, fabric remnants etc. 
GARAGE 
Table saw machine, some Christmas ornaments, gardening supplies, wood ladder. 
YARD 
Plant cuttings of her choosing. 
26. The Petitioner and Respondent should cooperate in the exchange and duplication of 
their children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties should collect the 
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to 
have the same photo or video, a duplicate should be made and the parties should share the cost of 
duplication. 
27. All property acquired by the parties post-separation should be awarded to the person 
who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and 
holding the other party harmless thereon, with the exception of any and all non-contributory retirement 
benefits, which should be divided equally at the time of the entry of the final decree of divorce. 
Real Property: 
28. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located 
at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City. Utah. 
29. Presently, the home has a value of at least S129,000 and has debt of S99.000, resulting 
in total equity of 530,000. Both parties should be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the 
marriage, or $15,000 each. 
8 
30. As Respondent has no financial assets with whirh in reestablish «i residentr w niiiiiki i 
future outside of those assets acquired during the marriage, it is reasonable and proper that she should 
be awarded the i HI 1» i hr-i ^i°«. home f/quiin. intcic11 imm Petitioner should he decide to 
maintain possession of'the marital home, 
" let :«(ioiilii II.M Hie opportunity to buy out the Respondent's 50% equity interest 
accrued during the marriage within thirty (30) days from the da. 
awarded judgement against Petitioner in the amount of S15.000 wn icn Petitioner should have 'the 
opportunity to satisfy by rciir. -• * . -._' 
Respondent's SI5.000judgment i:en "Aunm 5<>da%sfroni :,d, .: he ^ an ,* v ^.r:cA h-.- udgment 
nr^' '
 p
- ' " "- - . ;. , *.al property' as ;.:> ^orc ariu J\W,-SJ*-. proper", 
subject to him assuming and paying the mortgage obligation, all tax. insurant --v -• -•-.,. . 
ijijjtj linlil the Respondent harmless thereon. 
>! I f Petitioner is unable to satisfy" R? •. . 
.::ai Jaie. then the home should be immediately placed on the open market for sale b\ •• • - <r * 
cjiate agent agreed to by the parties ^ i pr'"'" n.Tommendcd hj •lit* "Til ei>ute ...r^:> .;.> ,.::e» ^.mii 
five percent ' :%) cf the recommended listing price should be accepted by the parties, and the proceeds 
of the:.:- 5: 
a. h:sL ro sa\ e\renses of * ale 
b. • 5v . ^ _ _ ^, .nortgages and liens; 
c. Then ;ne balance remaining thereafter to Ir Iriilrd equall'i h:\ ntxii ihe |tdim^, 
whether or not that balance meets or exceeds the anticipated S30.000 equity interest 
Q 
stated herein. 
33. Both parties should be ordered to execute all necessary documents to effectuate the sale 
of said property as requested by any real estate agent, loan officer or title company agent. 
34. In addition to the value of the home equity, Respondent is entitled to recoup from 
Petitioner 50% of the fire insurance proceeds from a fire which occurred in the marital residence in 
1998. After the parties separated, Petitioner received SI 7,404.58 as compensation for fire damage to 
the marital home and he has never accounted to Respondent for this amount. Insurance proceeds 
being a marital asset, Respondent is entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds collected by the 
Petitioner. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner in the amount of S8.702.29. 
Alimonv: 
35. Presently, Petitioner earns an income more than double that of Respondent. His 
income earning history, except for 1998 when he was off work due to disability, shows he has always 
been the primary income earner between the two parties, and has consistently and regularly earned the 
bulk of the household income. Over a five year period. Petitioner has earned approximately 76% of 
the combined marital income and Respondent has earned approximately 24% of the combined marital 
income, as shown below: 
i n 
Income from Priniiii i I [ilr iintl Only 
PETITIONER RESPONDENT 
1998 $22,198 
IUU7 '[ "Uj'h'l 
1QQ6 S 30,240 
1995 S27.051 
SIX,hl2 (S8.u: in L<0!>e Income) 
S: 1,663 
% .. ,810 
SO 
so 
Combined: S193232: SI 47.147 
\ \ < j "Hl 4."N I V n iM lul.ii 
546,085 
Sv,- i * \r, or -4(,o oi combined total 
;<:i" I"!ti.bcij on the historical income of the parties and their respective earning capacities, 
Petitioner has the abi;m " ^ - / ~ * - , 
more than double that of the Respondent, he has a longer work histon*' and more marketable job skills 
than Respondent, he has »h thf " " n^Pf.i, IL:Mtitani ,i|jplnnenia! income through his auto body 
shop rrpai" kur;r:-j *'e: * *"VJ:. J J > \ ear-old mar. :s at 'the prime income earning stage of'his career. 
- ^ ...wred the work force full time tor the first time in 
since her separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience I Ifr vu ml- HUMIM H> 
tin tHIILHIIuiii Lhe marriage includes primarily house cleaning and, crafting. Only after th e separation, did, 
she begin to work full time outside the home. 
38 Respondent has the need for alimony of at least $900 per month, as her base net income 
from employment is $1,100 per month, with no discretionary deductions from income, and her present 
monthly living expenses with the payment of child support are approximately S1.300. Her monthly 
expenses are artificially low at the present time as she resides in a residence inadequate for the long-
term, and pays at present only $200 per month. 
39. Respondent has been unable to secure permanent housing because of Petitioner's 
refusal to pay temporary alimony during the pendency of this action. She has Ih ed with friends and 
family members and is unable to obtain adequate housing for herself and her sons when they visit. In 
order to improve her housing situation. Respondent has an immediate need for alimony in excess of 
that amount sufficient to subsist. Therefore, it is reasonable for Respondent to pay in alimony at least 
S900 per month which will allow the Respondent to li\e in a reasonably comparable standard of living 
as does the Petitioner. 
40. Further, based on the parties respective financial positions, Petitioner has the ability to 
pay alimony of $900 per month and such an amount is reasonable to restore the Respondent to a 
standard of living comparable to that she enjoyed during the marriage and will equalize the parties 
respective standards of living. 
41. The Respondent's child support payment of S317 per month and Petitioner's alimony 
payment of S900 per month should be offset against one another, resulting in a net monthly payment 
of spousal support to Respondent in the amount of S583 per month. 
42. Petitioner's monthly alimony payment should be received by the Respondent one-half 
bv the 15th day of each month, and one-half bv the 20th dav of each month. 
43. Alimony should continue for 15 years after the final entry of the decree of divorce, and 
should terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or death. Should Petition— *r 
to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's cohabitation or remarriage. Respondent's obligation to 
pnv rTIi "int) ih r h 1111 >, 11pi <n 11 n \\ i1II h » inn i\ r! . 
Pension and Retirement Assets: 
4 1 .. lb-ion plan or other retirement benefits through his place of 
employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent receive 
50% of all benefits accrued •-- \ wi.uoner since the date of the marriage up to the :ime of the entrv of 
the final divorce decree and J;:-.**". — .: ^ ' "• 
nature. 
n. Ivi'sponileni shouii.1 : e jwardu J .in LUUU <H losses on ha >'J% share oi I 'am oner s 
retirement benefits awarded to her in this divorce action after the time of the entry of the final divorce 
decri1" 
Petitioner should be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic R elations Order 
• *jDt\ * to effectuate such a division, and the parties should be ordered to share equally any costs 
charged by the retirement pla n administrator to ad min ister the QDR 0 
M Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since 
the p< lilies separation t i- 1 lie: h she -\ ii i be a^  var led tc i: lei entii ely a s hei sole and exclusive property 
Restraining Order: 
I'i'UMntici "iiuul-J be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or anv oihr: place. 
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Income Tax Provisions: 
49. Petitioner should be awarded the right to claim the eldest child as a dependent for 
income tax purposes and Respondent awarded the right to claim the \ oungest child as a dependent for 
income tax purposes. This is fair and equitable as Petidoner has claimed both children as dependents 
on his state and federal income tax filings for the years 1997 and 1998. 
50. Petitioner and the Respondent should be ordered to file separate income tax returns for 
the year 1999 and following. 
Attorney's Fees: 
51. Petitioner should assume and pay his own attorney's fees. 
52. It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the sen ices of an attorney to 
represent her in this action which has been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming because of 
Petitioner's domestic violence against Respondent, his financial and visitation demands on 
Respondent, and his unwillingness to make reasonable efforts toward settlement. Petitioner is in the 
better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and he should be required to pay the 
Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of at least S8.995. 
Maiden Name: 
53. Petitioner should be restored the use of her former name of Cano. 
Miscellaneous Provisions: 
54. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
55. If oirjicf part}' dofaultc on hie oi hci obiigmium «n nrrimriri in thr fWpi uf uli•• LULL and 
1 4 
^ G jndgmrnt mnl if i i iirrr-inrj fi'n 'l'ir nflin finrtytr frrrlrrnfnmnnrnt i f t f r r '' ]l ' l ]" "*»"-
rigfanltinp n ^ ^ <$\n\Wfl rhrn bf TrvnrrtH hir nr W nttnrrry'i f?*f sin-i4 *vp»"<-»<* nf hrmmnnrfh* 
rnfnrrnmrmt action against the oihor party? 
56. The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem just and appropriate 
in this matter. 
DATED this 2 _ day of *ZU*^^U4A^ feu»»
 ? ^ ^ r 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ U A ^ 4 , 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifv that on the dav of _, 1999,1 caused to be delivered by 
fax and mail, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to the following: 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
fax: 486-5754 
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APPENDIX B 
MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563) 
KELLEY & KELLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
Fax: (801)531-6690 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD F. LOVATO, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
PETRA LOVATO, ; 
Respondent. ) 
) AMENDED 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 974904424DA 
) Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
) Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned action came trial on September 3, 1999, the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring presiding. Trial continued to September 8, 1999 and concluded on September 10,1999. 
Petitioner was present at all times and represented by counsel, Ronald C. Barker and Respondent was 
present at all times and represented by counsel Monica Z. Kelley. The Court, having received 
evidence and heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses, and having considered the exhibits and 
reviewed the file and the pleadings on file herein, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is now therefore, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled matter on May 4, 
1998 wherein the parties were granted a decree of divorce based on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. This Amended Decree of Divorce serves to address all issues of custody, visitation, 
property division and support not addressed in the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce previously entered. 
2. The parties separated on or about August 16, 1997 and on that date as a practical 
matter, the parties' ended their economic partnership. Accordingly, the valuation of property and 
obligations shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date. 
Child Custody, Visitation and Support: 
3. The parties are hereby awarded the joint legal custody of the two minor children bom 
as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian Lovato, age 13 bom April 18, 1986. and Alexander Daniel 
Lovato, age 11 bom June 24, 1988, with the primary physical custody of the children awarded to the 
Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal right to visit with the minor children. 
Petitioner and Respondent shall share the rights, privileges, duties and powers of a parenthood, 
pursuant to UCA 30-3-10.1 (1953 as amended). 
4. Visitation shall occur as the parties agree, with the Respondent having liberal and 
frequent access to the minor children. If they are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, then 
Respondent's visitation schedule shall not less than the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35. The 
parties shall further adhere to the Advisory Guidelines found in UCA 30-3-33 for their visitation and 
custody practices. 
5. Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a monthly gross 
2 
income of $3. 153, which does not include compensation for his tool allowance or income from any 
other source. 
6. Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns a gross monthly income 
of $1,551. plus an additional $250 per month from her craft business, for a total combined monthly 
income of $1,801. 
7. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) Respondent shall pay to 
Petitioner child support of $364.00 per month. 
8. Respondent's child support obligation shall continue until the youngest child becomes 
18 years of age. or has graduated from high school during the child's normal and expected year of 
graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation shall be recalculated as 
provided for by law, and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of age, or has graduated 
from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. 
9. Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time 
periods during which a child is with the Respondent by order of the court or by agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the 
custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
10. Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the 5th day 
of every month and one half by the 20th day of every month, or otherwise as the parties may agree. 
11. Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action and 
has no child support arrearage owing. As Respondent is current in her child support obligation to 
Petitioner, automatic income withholding shall not be ordered. However, to further the convenience 
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of the parties, the Petitioner and Respondent may coordinate the payment of child support through 
automatic deposit to the recipient's bank account on a regular monthly basis. 
12. Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.15, Petitioner shall maintain insurance for medical 
expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner shall provide verification of coverage to 
the Respondent along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to the Respondent 
each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or should 
have known of the change. 
13. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the health insurance premium 
actually paid by Petitioner for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently, 
Petitioner pays SI51.19 per month for health and dental insurance coverage for the minor children, 
and Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner her 50% obligation of $75.59 along with her monthly child 
support payment. 
14. Respondent's combined monthly obligation to Petitioner for child support and 
insurance reimbursement shall be $439.69. 
15. Both parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by 
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
16. Respondent shall pay one half of all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
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expenses Petitioner has incurred during the pendency of this action, subject to Petitioner presenting to 
her verification of expenses actually paid. 
17. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the 
above verification requirements. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations: 
18. Petitioner, shall assume and pay any and all outstanding debt as his sole and exclusive 
obligation and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless on the following debts and obligations: 
a. Countrywide Home Mortgage - 5100,156 forlst home mortgage 
b. Salt Lake Credit Union - $9,398 for 2nd home mortgage 
c. John Paras Furniture: $869.52 for couch, stereo, vacuum and VCR 
d. Granite Furniture: $1,119.41 for carpet installed in marital home 
e. RC Willey: $656.83 for dining room set 
f. Salt Lake County Credit Union, $ 19,609.43 for motor vehicle loans 
19. Any debt listed in the Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and not otherwise provided for 
herein, shall be the sole and exclusive obligation of the Petitioner and he shall indemnify and hold the 
Respondent harmless thereon. 
20. The parties shall share equally the uninsured medical expenses totaling $4,560 fir 
hospital, dental and pharmacy bills for the minor children accrued during the marriage and prior to the 
parties separation. Respondent shall pay her one-half obligation toward theses expenses ($2,280) by 
reducing her lien on the marital home by that amount. 
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Provisions Relating to Personal Property: 
21. All personal property not the subject of debt described in Paragraph 18 herein, shall be 
distributed between lie parties through an alternating selection to be first exercised by the Petitioner. 
The distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by the parties and shall be supervised by counsel or 
counsel's designee. 
22. The Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in the exchange and duplication of their 
children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties shall collect the 
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to 
have the same photo or video, a duplicate shall be made and the parties shall share the cost of 
duplication. 
23. All property acquired by the parties' post-separation shall be awarded to the person 
who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and 
holding the other party harmless thereon. 
24. No joint bank, deposit or investment accounts are owned by the parties. Each party 
shall be awarded his or her bank, deposit or investment account owned by him or her exclusively at 
the time of trial. 
Real Property: 
25. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located 
at 5896 West Dixie Drive, West Valley City, Utah, which has a value of $130,000. At the time of 
separation, the home had debt of $109,554 from the first and second home mortgages, resulting in 
total equity of $20,446. Each party shall be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the marriage, 
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or SI0,223. 
26. In 1998 Petitioner received insurance proceeds of $17,413.58 to compensate the parties 
for property damage caused by a fire in the marital home. The insurance proceeds are found to be a 
marital asset. The parties stipulated that Petitioner paid 52,500 from the insurance proceeds to pay for 
repair to the fire-damaged home, but the Petitioner failed to satisfactorily trace the balance of the 
insurance proceeds to expenses related to home repairs. 
27. Petitioner testified at trial that he used most of the insurance proceeds for his living 
expenses and bills while he was not working in 1998 due to illness, and that Respondent should not be 
entitled to recover any portion of the insurance proceeds since the work was, in fact, done and to 
award Respondent reimbursement of the unused insurance proceeds would be to reward her for the 
benefit of Petitioner's effort and relationships which were used in making the repairs to the home. 
28. At the time of the fire, Petitioner wras living in the home by himself and Respondent 
had no control over how the repairs were done or who did them. Petitioner alone made that 
determination, and he chose to have them done at a discount and enjoyed the use of the insurance 
proceeds for his general support. 
29. At trial, Petitioner testified that all the home repairs had been done in the same manner 
as would a professional, only at no expense to him since the labor and materials were donated by 
friends and church members. He testified that the home was fully repaired and that paying someone to 
do the repairs or having them done at no cost resulted in the same condition, that the home was worth 
$130,000 repaired, and therefore it was his prerogative to use almost $15,000 as he saw fit. 
30. The Court found that the $ 14,913.58 not expended for home repair is a marital asset 
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and as such it shall be divided equally between the parties. Therefore, Respondent is awarded 
$7,456.79, which equals one-half the value of the unused insurance proceeds. 
31. Respondent's ownership interest in the marital home is based on the home equity, 
unused fire insurance proceeds, minus her obligation for joint medical expenses as follows: 
50% of accrued equity + $10,223.00 
50% of unused insurance - $ 7.456.79 
Subtotal $17,679.79 
50% joint medical - S 2.280.00 
Total $15,399.79. 
32. Respondent is awarded a lien against the marital home in the amount of $ 15.399.79, 
together with interest at the statutory post-judgment rate (presently 6.513% per annum). 
33. Petitioner shall immediately satisfy Respondent's lien upon the first of the following 
events to occur: 
a. The home is sold; 
b. The youngest child turns 18 and graduates high school, whichever occurs later; 
c. The minor children cease using the home as their primary residence; 
d. The Petitioner remarries or cohabitates; or 
e. The Petitioner uses the home as security for new debt or obtains refinancing on 
the home for any other purpose other than to satisfy Respondent's lien. 
34. Petitioner shall assume and pay any and all taxes, insurance, maintenance or other 
obligation related to the marital home and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
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35. Respondent shall execute a special warranty deed subject to the lien described herein. 
Alimonv: 
36. Throughout the parties' marriage. Petitioner has been the primary income earner of the 
household. He has always had a full-time job and presently is employed for Salt Lake City 
Corporation in its maintenance division where he has worked for over 11 years. 
37. He also worked at his side business of auto body repair and owned a body shop in 
Kearns. Utah that he has operated for approximately 10 years which is now closed following 
Petitioner's eviction from the site of the body shop. Respondent testified that he earned between 
$1,000 to $1,500 per month. Petitioner testified that the body shop had profitable years where he 
earned $10,000 after expenses. Petitioner testified the shop has not been profitable for him since 
1998. Petitioner testified he no longer operates the body shop and closed it a month before trial due to 
his health problems and the demands of single parenthood. Petitioner testified that the shop was 
usually profitable before 1997, but that due primarily to an illness. Petitioner lost customers and the 
business became unprofitable. 
38. Respondent also worked throughout the marriage, but on a much smaller scale. She 
had housecleaning jobs and also earned an income from her craft busines to support herself, her 
hobbies and to contribute extra money to the family expenses. Respondent operates her craft business 
and earns $250 per month from the same. This is in addition to her income from her regular 
employment at OC Tanner, where she has earned $15,998.15 including overtime, holiday pay, 
personal pay, profit sharing and vacation pay through August 21,1999. Therefore, Respondent's 1999 
gross monthly income includes $2,064 from OC tanner employment, plus $250 per month from her 
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craft business, for a total combined gross monthh income of $2.314. 
39. From Respondent's gross income of $2.314 per month, she has necessary deductions of 
$516.29 bringing her total net monthly income from all sources to $1,797.71. With approximately 
$1,800 in net income, Respondent has a need for alimony as her present reasonable expenses include: 
Respondent's Monthly Expenses 
•Food and Household Supplies 
1 Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat 
•Telephone 
1 Laundry and Cleaning 
• Clothing 
• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted) 
•Payment of Child, Spousal Support re: Prior Marriage 
•Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation) 
1 INCIDENTALS 
1 Grooming 
1 Grfts 
lAUTO EXPENSES 
1 Auto payments 
1 Insurance 
1 Gas 
1 Oil, Maintenance Repair 
1 Installment Payment(s) - Monthly Debts & Obligations 
(Storage USA 
[Children's Monthly Health and Dental Insurance Premium 
•Other expenses not specifically requested above and specify below 
ITOTAL EXPENSES 
50 00 
50 00 
251 00 
60 00! 
eoooj 
50 00 
J S200 00| 
I 250 00J 
I 75 00J 
25 00| 
25 00| 
50 00| 
30 00 j 
317 16| 
200 001 
100.00| 
421 00| 
57.00| 
75.59| 
$1,825.751 
40. Respondent's present monthly expenses are artificially low because her rent is $200 per 
month for a bedroom she rents in a home she shares with other adults and children. Both parties 
testified to the need for Respondent to obtain proper housing so she can take the minor children for 
overnight and extended visits. Because of her present housing situation, she is unable to visit with the 
children for any extended period of time. Respondent testified at trial that in order to obtain suitable 
housing for at least an apartment, she would pay rent of at least $500 to $600 per month. A reasonable 
rental payment would increase her present expenses by S3 00 to $400 per month and her home utilities 
would likely increase as well. 
41. Petitioner has the ability to assist Respondent with a monthly alimony payment. 
Petitioner testified at trial he receives a regular salary from his employer, and receives the same 
amount of pay every two weeks: $1,484.90. After deducting $30.00 per pay period for Petitioner's 
tool allowance, his gross monthly income of $3,253.00. 
42. Petitioner's monthly deductions from gross income for state and federal income taxes, 
life insurance, disability insurance, union dues are $400 per month. His health and dental insurance 
cost for himself and 50% of the boys' insurance is an additional $174.19. According to Petitioner's 
pay check stub Petitioner has little federal income tax withheld and his 1998 federal income tax return 
shows he had no tax liability for 1998. Petitioner has a deduction of $166.66 per month for "Flex 
Medical" which is his discretionary medical savings account which the court does not consider to be a 
non-discretionary deduction from his gross income. 
43. Therefore, Petitioner's non-discretionary deductions as well as basic medical and life 
insurance withholdings total $574.19 per month, and from the taxes withheld, Petitioner receives a 
refund from his income taxes withheld. Thus, Petitioner's net income totals at least $2,643.09 per 
month. Petitioner's net income of $2,643.09 plus child support and medical reimbursement of 
$439.69 yields a total net monthly income to $3,082.78. From this, Petitioner has monthly living 
expenses of $3,043. 
Petitioner's Monthly Living Expenses 
• Rent or Mortgage Payments (Residence) 
•Maintenance (Residence) 
• Food and Household Supplies 
• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat 
•Telephone 
•Laundry and Cleaning 
•Clothing 
• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted) 
•School Tuition, Activity Expenses 
• Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation) 
1 Incidentals / Grooming 
• Bankruptcy Trustee Payment 
[Auto Expenses 
ITOTAL EXPENSES | 
S1,005.00| 
50.00J 
400.00J 
280.OOj 
35.00| 
80.00| 
30.00| 
60.00| 
100.00| 
100 00| 
30.00| 
598.00| 
275 OOJ 
$3,043.001 
44. Petitioner's standard of living is higher than that of Respondent's. He has greater 
flexibility, even with his bankruptcy obligations, to reduce expenses, particularly transportation 
expenses. It is equitable to shift to Petitioner the responsibility for accommodating Respondent's need 
to obtain housing suitable to meet her parenting responsibilities. Although the Court has determined 
that there is insufficient factual basis to impute additional income to Petitioner based on his now 
defunct auto body business, the Court is confident that he can generate income from this activity, even 
on a hit and miss basis which, when coupled with a reduction in expenses, is more likely than not to 
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make it possible for Respondent to meet her legitimate housing needs through the payment of alimony. 
45. Accordingly. Petitioner shall pay Respondent alimony in the amount of $400 per month 
for a duration of time equal to the date of the parties' marriage through the time of trial, or 15 years. 
46. The Court acknowledges that this alimony award is insufficient to fully meet 
Respondent's living needs and will leave Petitioner pressed financially to meet this obligation if he 
does not generate as much supplemental business income as he has done in the past. However, the 
Court views Petitioner's obligation to assist in Respondent's support as a primary obligation o\er that 
of his obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy. As a matter of public policy, the Court expects the 
Respondent's monthly alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's to be met. because 
without the Respondent's efforts during the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other 
property he enjoys today. 
47. This alimony award is reasonable because Petitioner has a longer work history and 
more marketable job skills than Respondent, he has the ability to generate a much greater income in a 
short amount of time when compared to Respondent's work history and job skills. Petitioner is a 45-
year-old man and is at the prime income earning stage of his career. 
48. Respondent, on the other hand, has entered the work force full time for the first time at 
the time of separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience. Her work history 
throughout the marriage includes primarily house cleaning and crafting. 
49. An alimony award of $400 per month will allow the Respondent an opportunity to 
equalize her standard of living to one comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage and will 
equalize the parties' respective incomes. 
50. Petitioner's monthly alimony payment shall be offset by Respondent's child support 
and insurance share payment of $439.69, resulting in a net monthly payment from Respondent to 
Petitioner of $39.69. This shall be paid by the Respondent one-half by the 5th day of each month, and 
one-half by the 20th day of each month. 
51. Petitioner's alimony obligation shall terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, 
cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's 
cohabitation or remarriage, Respondent's obligation to pay monthly child support shall be revived. 
Pension and Retirement Assets: 
52. Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of 
employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. Respondent shall be awarded 50% of all pension benefits 
accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage to August 16. 1997 pursuant to the Woodward 
formula. 
53. Petitioner shall be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO) to effectuate the division of the retirement benefits as ordered herein, and the parties shall be 
ordered to share equally any costs charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the 
QDRO, anticipated to be $250 total. 
54. Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since 
the parties' separation which shall be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property. 
Restraining Order: 
55. Each party shall be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place. 
Income Tax Provisions: 
56. The parties shall share equally the right to claim the minor children as dependents for 
income tax purposes. Beginning with their 1999 state and federal income tax filings, the parties shall 
coordinate their income tax return preparation and file their income tax returns by March 15th of every 
year. Prior to March 15th. the parties shall cooperate in the exchange of the calculation of their income 
tax returns with and without the dependent exemptions and determine which party would receive the 
greatest tax benefit from claiming the dependent exemption(s). The person with the greatest tax 
benefit shall claim the dependent exemption(s) in any given year. The person who claims the 
dependent exemption(s) shall isolate the value of the tax benefit attributed to the dependent exemption 
only, and the claiming party shall pay the non-claiming party 50% of the benefit received. 
57. The claiming party shall make payment to the non-claiming part}' within thirty (30) 
days of the receipt of any refund, or at the time the non-claiming part}' has tax due at the time of filing, 
whichever occurs first. 
58. Should this process prove to be too time consuming, expensive, or cumbersome for the 
parties based on their circumstances, the Court will entertain a Petition to Modify and make a direct 
award to the parties the right to claim one child or the other as a dependent for tax purposes. 
Attorney's Fees: 
59. Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees, which have amounted to at 
least $8,040. 
60. As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees, he 
shall pay Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of $11,771 upon a showing of the reasonableness of 
the same. 
req 
Maiden Name: 
61. The Court affirms Respondent's right to be restored the use of her former name of 
"Petra Martha Cano." 
Miscellaneous Provisions: 
62. Each party shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
idiu pail) dcifaulis uii liis ui iiei uuligauuus as uidciid II LIIL decree of d iwce and 
judgment and it is r?rrsQ^^' f n r t h p n t H p r rarr! To qpp^ enforcement ofthr Tniiri* i mil ill nun 
defaulting port^ i ohall be awarded hi? or hf?r attorney':, fouj anil w.ipuists fui ubuiiiing iii uifunanent 
order againot the defaulting paiLT. 
DATED this J_ day of {^A^UHJJJL*^ , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE HONORABLE RONALD^). NEHRING 
Third District Coun Judge 
Approved as to form 
Ron C. Barker 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebv certifv that on the *-*• dav of fat , 1999,1 delivered by fax and mail, a 
true and correct copy of the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE to: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney at Law 
2870 South State St. 
Salt Lake Citv. UT 84115 
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